by by Johannes Kepler et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shadow Economies around the World: 
What do we know? 
by 
SCHNEIDER, Friedrich and KLINGLMAIR, Robert
*) 
Working Paper No. 0403 
April 2004 
D DE EP PA AR RT TM ME EN NT T   O OF F   E EC CO ON NO OM MI IC CS S
J JO OH HA AN NN NE ES S   K KE EP PL LE ER R   U UN NI IV VE ER RS SI IT TY Y   O OF F
L LI IN NZ Z
Johannes Kepler University of Linz
Department of Economics
Altenberger Strasse 69
A-4040 Linz - Auhof, Austria
www.econ.jku.at
friedrich.schneider@jku.at
phone +43 (0)70 2468 -8210, -28210 (fax) 
07.06.04, C:\Studien\Pfusch\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc      1 
February 2004 
Version 4 
C:/Studien/Pfusch/ShadEconomyWorld5.doc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SHADOW ECONOMIES AROUND THE WORLD: WHAT DO WE 
KNOW? 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Friedrich Schneider*) 
 
and 
 
Robert Klinglmair**) 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Using various statistical procedures, estimates about the size of the shadow economy in 
110 developing, transition and OECD countries are presented. The average size of the 
shadow economy (in percent of official GDP) over 1999-2000 in developing countries is 
41%, in transition countries 38% and in OECD countries 18.0%. An increasing burden of 
taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulatory activities 
are the driving forces for the growth and size of the shadow economy. If the shadow 
economy increases by one percent the annual growth rate of the “official” GDP of a 
developing country (of a industrialized and/or transition country) decreases by 0.6% 
(increases by 0.8 and 1.0 respectively).  
 
JEL-class.: O17, O5, D78, H2, H11, H26. 
 
Key-words: shadow economy, interaction of the shadow economy with the official one, 
tax burden 
 
 
 
 
*) Professor of Economics, Dr. DDr.h.c. Friedrich Schneider, Department of Economics, 
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, A-4040 Linz-Auhof, Austria. Phone: 0043-732-2468-
8210, Fax: -8209. E-mail: friedrich.schneider@jku.at, http://www.econ.jku.at. 
**) Research assistant, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, A-
4040 Linz-Auhof, Austria. 
  
07.06.04, C:\Studien\Pfusch\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc      2 
Contents 
 
1  Introduction .......................................................................................................................3 
2  Defining the Shadow Economy.........................................................................................4 
3  The Size of the Shadow Economies all over the World – Findings for 110 Countries5 
3.1  Developing Countries...............................................................................................................5 
3.2  Transition Countries.................................................................................................................9 
3.3  Highly developed OECD-Countries .......................................................................................12 
3.4  Shadow Economy Labor Market.............................................................................................13 
4  The Main Causes of Determining the Shadow Economy.............................................15 
4.1  Tax and Social Security Contribution Burdens ......................................................................15 
4.2  Intensity of Regulations ..........................................................................................................18 
4.3  Public Sector Services ............................................................................................................19 
5  The Dynamic Effects of the Shadow Economy on Official Economy.........................20 
5.1  Theoretical Background .........................................................................................................20 
5.2  The Main Results ....................................................................................................................22 
5.2.1  The Sample of 109 Developing and Developed Countries ........................................................... 22 
5.2.2  21 OECD countries....................................................................................................................... 25 
5.2.3  75 Transition and Developing Countries....................................................................................... 27 
6  Summary and Conclusions.............................................................................................29 
7  Appendices .......................................................................................................................31 
7.1  Appendix 1: Methods to Estimate the Size of the Shadow Economy ......................................31 
7.1.1  Direct Approaches......................................................................................................................... 31 
7.1.2  Indirect Approaches...................................................................................................................... 32 
7.1.3  The model approach...................................................................................................................... 39 
7.2  Appendix 2: Data Set and Detailed Estimation result............................................................42 
7.2.1  Countries....................................................................................................................................... 42 
7.2.2  Definition of the Variables............................................................................................................ 44 
7.2.3  Regression Outputs in more Detail ...............................................................................................4 9 
8  References.........................................................................................................................53 
 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    3 
1 Introduction 
 
As underground economic activities (including shadow economic ones) are a fact of life 
around the world, most societies attempt to control these activities through various measures 
like punishment, prosecution, economic growth or education. Gathering statistics about who 
is engaged in underground activities, the frequencies with which these activities are occurring 
and the magnitude of them, is crucial for making effective and efficient decisions regarding 
the allocations of a country’s resources in this area. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to get 
accurate information about these underground (or as a subset shadow economy) activities on 
the goods and labor market, because all individuals engaged in these activities wish not to be 
identified. Hence, the estimation of the shadow economy activities can be considered as a 
scientific passion for knowing the unknown.  
 
Although quite a large literature
1) on single aspects of the hidden economy exists and a 
comprehensive survey has been written by Schneider (the author of this paper) and Enste., the 
subject is still quite controversial
2) as there are disagreements about the definition of shadow 
economy activities, the estimation procedures and the use of their estimates in economic 
analysis and policy aspects.
3) Nevertheless around the world, there are some indications for an 
increase of the shadow economy but little is known about the size of the shadow economies in 
transition, development and developed countries for the year 2000.  
 
Hence, the goal of this paper is threefold: to undertake the challenging task to estimate the 
shadow economy for 110 countries, to provide some insights about the main causes of the 
shadow economy and to study the dynamic effects of the shadow economy on the official one. 
In section 2 an attempt is made to define the shadow economy. Section 3 presents the 
empirical results of the size of the shadow economy over 110 countries all over the world. 
Section 4 examines the main causes of the shadow economy. Section 5 presents the dynamic 
effects of the shadow economy on the official one. In section 6 a summary is given and some 
                                                           
1) The literature about the „shadow“, „underground“, „informal“, „second“, “cash-“ or „parallel“, economy is 
increasing. Various topics, on how to measure it, its causes, its effect on the official economy are analyzed. See 
for example, survey type publications by Frey and Pommerehne (1984); Thomas (1992); Loayza (1996); Pozo 
(1996); Lippert and Walker (1997); Schneider (1994a, 1994b, 1997, 1998a); Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer 
(1997), Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a); and Gerxhani (2003). For an overall survey of the 
global evidence of the size of the shadow economy see Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002), Schneider (2003) and 
Alm, Martinez and Schneider (2004). 
2) Compare e.g. in the Economic Journal, vol. 109, no. 456, June 1999 the feature “controversy: on the hidden 
economy”. 
3) Compare the different opinions of Tanzi (1999), Thomas (1999) and Giles (1999). 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    4 
policy conclusions are drawn. Finally in the two appendices (1 and 2) the various methods to 
estimate the shadow economy are presented and the data set as well as some further 
econometric results are shown. 
 
 
2  Defining the Shadow Economy 
Most authors trying to measure the shadow economy face the difficulty of how to define it. 
One commonly used working definition is all currently unregistered economic activities that 
contribute to the officially calculated (or observed) Gross National Product.
4) Smith (1994, p. 
18) defines it as „market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal that 
escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP.“ Or to put it in another way, one of the 
broadest definitions of it, includes…”those economic activities and the income derived from 
them that circumvent or other wise government regulation, taxation or observation”.
5) As 
these definitions still leave open a lot of questions, table 2.1 is helpful for developing a better 
feeling for what could be a reasonable consensus definition of the legal economy and the 
illegal underground (or shadow) economy. 
 
From table 2.1, it becomes clear that the shadow economy includes unreported income from 
the production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or barter transactions – and 
so includes all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they reported to the 
state (tax) authorities. A more precise definition seems quite difficult, if not impossible as the 
shadow economy evolves over time adjusting to taxes, enforcement changes, and general 
societal attitudes. This paper does not focus on tax evasion or tax compliance, because it 
would get to long, and moreover tax evasion is a different subject, where already a lot of 
research has been underway.
6) 
 
                                                           
4) This definition is used for example, by Feige (1989, 1994), Schneider (1994a, 2003), Frey and Pommerehne 
(1984), and Lubell (1991). Do-it-yourself activities are not included. For estimates for Germany see Karmann 
(1990). 
5) This definition is taken from Dell’Anno (2003) and Feige (1989); see also Thomas (1999), Fleming, Roman 
and Farrell (2000). 
6) Compare, e.g. the survey of Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) and the paper by Kirchler, Maciejovsky and 
Schneider (2002). 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    5 
Table 2.1: A Taxonomy of Types of Underground Economic Activities
1) 
Type of Activity  Monetary Transactions  Non Monetary Transactions 
 
Illegal 
Activities 
 
Trade with stolen goods; drug dealing 
and manufacturing; prostitution; 
gambling; smuggling; fraud; etc.  
 
Barter of drugs, stolen goods, 
smuggling etc. Produce or growing 
drugs for own use. Theft for own 
use. 
 
 
 
Tax Evasion 
 
Tax 
Avoidance 
 
Tax Evasion 
 
Tax Avoidance 
 
Legal 
Activities 
Unreported income 
from self-
employment; Wages, 
salaries and assets 
from unreported work 
related to legal 
services and goods 
Employee 
discounts, 
fringe benefits 
Barter of legal 
services and 
goods 
All do-it-yourself 
work and 
neighbor help 
1) Structure of the table is taken from Lippert and Walker (1997, p. 5) with additional remarks. 
 
3  The Size of the Shadow Economies all over the World – Findings 
for 110 Countries 
For single countries and sometimes for a group of countries research has been undertaken to 
estimate the size of the shadow economy using various methods and different time periods. In 
tables 3.1 to 3.6, an attempt is made to undertake a consistent comparison of estimates of the 
size of the shadow economies of various countries, for a fixed period, generated by using 
similar methods which will be discussed in Appendix 1 (chapter 7), by reporting the results 
for the shadow economy for 110 countries all over the world for the year 2000.
7) 
 
3.1 Developing  Countries 
8) 
 
The physical input (electricity) method, the currency demand and the model (DYMIMIC) 
approach are used for the developing countries. The results are grouped for Africa, Asia and 
Central and South America,
9) and are shown in tables 3.1.-3.3.  
                                                           
7)One should be aware that such country comparisons give only a very rough picture of the ranking of the size of 
the shadow economy over the countries, because each method has shortcomings, which are discussed in 
appendix 2 (part 7.2). See, e.g., Thomas (1992, 1999) and Tanzi (1999). A least in this comparison the same time 
period (2000) is used for all countries. 
8) For an extensive and excellent literature survey of the research about the shadow economy in developing 
countries see Gerxhani (2003),who stresses thorough out her paper that the destination between developed and 
developing countries with respect to the shadow economy is of great importance. Due to space reasons this point 
is not further elaborated here also the former results and literature. 
9) The disadvantage of these grouping is that especially in Asia we have also highly developed countries like 
Japan, Singapore, etc. and also in Africa the South-Africa. 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    6 
 
The results for 24 African countries are shown in table 3.1.; and on average, the size of the 
shadow economy in Africa was 41% of “official” GDP for the year 1999/2000. 
Table 3.1 
 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Nigeria (with 59.4, 58.3 and 57.9% respectively) have by far the 
largest shadow economies; in the middle are Mozambique, Cote d’Ivoire and Madagascar 
with 40.3, 39.9 and 39.6%; at the lower end are Botswana with 33.4, Cameroon with 32.8 and 
South Africa with 28.4%. The sizes of the shadow economies in Africa are typically quite 
large.  
 
In table 3.2 the results for Asia are shown, recognizing that it is somewhat difficult to treat all 
Asian countries equally because Japan, Singapore and Hongkong are highly developed 
countries and the others more or less developing countries.  
 
Table 3.2 
 
If we consider these 26 Asian countries
10), where the results are shown in table 3, Thailand 
has by far the largest shadow economy in the year 2000 with the size of 52.6% of official 
GDP; followed by Sri Lanka (44.6%) and the Philippines (43.4%). In the middle range are 
India with an estimated shadow economy of 23.1% of official GDP, Israel with 21.9% and 
Taiwan and China
11) with 19.6%. At the lower end are Singapore (13.1%) and Japan (11.3%). 
On average the Asian countries have a size of the shadow economy of 26% of official GDP 
for the year 1999/2000. One realizes that the average size of the Asian shadow economies is 
considerably lower compared with the ones of African and South and Latin American States – 
partly due to the fact that in Asia we have a number of highly developed industrialized 
countries with low shadow economies. 
                                                           
10) The case of India has been extensively investigated by Chatterjee, Chaudhury and Schneider (2003). 
11) Here only parts of China are considered, which are converted into market economy. 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    7 
 
Table 3.1: The size of the shadow and official economy of 24 African nations 
 AFRICAN nation GNP at market prices 
(current US$, billion) 
2000 
Shadow Economy in 
% of GNP 1999/2000 
Shadow Economy 
(current USD in 
billion) 2000 
Shadow Economy 
GNP per capita 
(current US$) 
GNP per capita 2000, 
Atlas method (current 
US$) 
 
1 Algeria  506,1  34,1 172,6  538,8  1580  
2 Benin  21,5  45,2 9,7  167,2  370  
3 Botswana  52,8  33,4 17,6  1102,2  3300  
4 Burkina Faso  21,7  38,4 8,3  80,6  210  
5 Cameroon  82,8  32,8 27,2  190,2  580  
6 Cote d'Ivoire  86,1  39,9 34,4  239,4  600  
7 Egypt, Arab Rep. 996,6  35,1 349,8  523,0  1490  
8 Ethiopia  63,3  40,3 25,5  40,3 100  
9 Ghana  48,3  38,4 18,5  126,7  330  
10 Kenya  102,2  34,3  35,1  120,1  350   
11 Madagascar  38,0  39,6 15,1  99,0 250  
12 Malawi  16,6  40,3 6,7  68,5  170  
13 Mali  22,6  41,0 9,3  98,4  240  
14 Morocco  324,6  36,4 118,1  429,5  1180  
15 Mozambique 
1)  35,8  40,3 14,4  84,6 210  
16 Niger  18,1  41,9 7,6  75,4  180  
17 Nigeria  367,3  57,9 212,6  150,5 260  
18 Senegal  42,9  43,2 18,5  211,7  490  
19 South Africa  1226,4  28,4 348,3  857,7  3020  
20 Tanzania  89,8  58,3 52,4  157,4  270  
21 Tunisia  185,7  38,4 71,3  806,4  2100  
22 Uganda  61,6  43,1 26,5  129,3  300  
23 Zambia  27,9  48,9 13,6  146,7  300  
24 Zimbabwe 
1)  71,4  59,4 42,4  273,2  460  
 AVERAGE  188  41  69  280  764   
1) Due to civil war and political unrest unreliable figures.    
Source: own calculations based on Worldbank Data, Washington D.C., 2002.   07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    8 
 
Table 3.2: The size of the shadow and official economy of 26 Asian countries 
  ASIA  GNP at market prices 
(current US$, billion) 
2000 
Shadow Economy 
in % of GNP 
1999/2000 
Shadow Economy 
(current USD in bill.) 
2000 
Shadow Economy 
GNP per capita 
(current US$) 
GNP per capita 2000, 
Atlas method (current 
US$) 
 
1 Bangladesh  468,9  35,6 166,9  131,7  370  
2 China 
1)  10652,8  13,1 1395,5  110,0  840  
3 Hongkong, China 1654,7  16,6 274,7 4302,7  25920  
4 India  4531,8  23,1 1046,8  104,0  450  
5 Indonesia 
2)  1426,6  19,4 276,8  110,6  570  
6 Iran  937,7  18,9 177,2  304,3  1610  
7 Israel  1060,1  21,9 232,2 3659,5  16710  
8 Japan  49011,6  11,3 5538,3 4025,1  35620  
9 Jordan  83,1  19,4 16,1  331,7  1710  
10 Korea, Rep.  4550,2  27,5 1251,3 2450,3  8910  
11 Lebanon 
2)  174,2  34,1 59,4 1367,4  4010  
12 Malaysia  823,9  31,1 256,2 1051,2  3380  
13 Mongolia 
1)  9,5  18,4 1,8  71,8  390  
14 Nepal  56,9  38,4 21,8  92,2  240  
15 Pakistan  596,0  36,8 219,3  161,9  440  
16 Philippines  793,2  43,4 344,2  451,4  1040  
17 Saudi Arabia  1736,6  18,4 319,5 1330,3  7230  
18 Singapore  983,7  13,1 128,9 3240,9  24740  
19 Sri Lanka  160,0  44,6 71,4  379,1  850  
20 Syria  159,6  19,3 30,8  181,4  940  
21 Taiwan, China  3144,0  19,6 616,2 2720,5  13880  
22 Thailand  1205,4  52,6 634,1 1052,0  2000  
23 Turkey  2009,2  32,1 644,9  995,1  3100  
24 Unit. Arab Emir.  0,0  26,4 0,0 7191,4 27240  
25 Vietnam 
1)  313,5  15,6 48,9  60,8  390  
26 Yemen  73,9  27,4 20,2  101,4  370  
 AVERAGE  3331  26  531  1384  7037   
1) Still a mostly communist dominated country. 2) Due to civil war and political unrest unreliable figures. 
Source: own calculations based on Worldbank data, Washington D.C., 2002.   07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    9 
In table 3.3 the results of the sizes of the shadow economies for the year 2000 for 17 South 
and Latin American countries are shown. The average size of shadow economy of these 17 
countries is 41% of official GDP. 
 
Table 3.3 
 
The largest shadow economy is in Bolivia with 67.1%, followed by Panama (64.1%) and Peru 
(59.9%). The smallest shadow economies are in Chile (19.8%) and Argentina (25.4%). 
Overall the average sizes of the shadow economies of South and Latin America and of Africa 
are generally similar and somewhat larger than in Asia – mostly due to the fact that in Asia 
we have a number of highly industrialized and developed countries (Japan, Singapore, etc.). 
 
 
3.2 Transition  Countries 
 
The measurement of the size and development of the shadow economy in the transition countries 
has been undertaken since the late 80s starting with the work of Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), 
Johnson et.al. (1997) and Lacko (2000). They all are using the physical input (electricity) method 
(see Appendix 7.1.2.5) and come up with quite large figures. In the work of Alexeev and Pyle 
(2003) the above mentioned studies are critically evaluated arguing that the estimated sizes of the 
unofficial economies are to a large content a historical phenomenon only partly determined by 
institutional factors. 
 
In this paper the sizes of the shadow economies of the transition countries which have been 
estimated the year 2000 using the DYMIMIC approach, are presented in table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4 
 
23 transition countries have been investigated and the average size of the shadow economy 
relative to official GDP is 38% for the year 1999/2000. Georgia has the by far largest shadow 
economy at 67.3% of GDP, followed by Azerbaijan with 60.6% and Ukraine with 52.2%. In the 
middle field are Bulgaria and Romania (36.9 and 34.4%, respectively) and at the lower end are 
Hungary (25.1%), the Czech Republic (19.1%) and the Slowac. Republic (18.9%).  07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    10 
 
Table 3.3: The size of the shadow and official economy of 17 Latin and South American Countries 
  SOUTH AMERICA    GNP at market prices 
(current US$, billion) 
2000 
Shadow 
Economy in % of 
GNP 1999/2000 
Shadow Economy 
(current USD in 
billion) 2000 
Shadow Economy 
GNP per capita 
(current US$) 
GNP per capita 2000, 
Atlas method (current 
US$) 
 
1 Argentina    2774,4  25,4 704,7  1894,8  7460  
2 Bolivia    80,6  67,1 54,1  664,3  990  
3 Brazil    5697,7  39,8 2267,7  1424,8  3580  
4 Chile    681,4  19,8 134,9  908,8  4590  
5 Colombia    788,5  39,1 308,3  789,8  2020  
6 Costa Rica    146,2  26,2 38,3  998,2  3810  
7 Dominican Republic    186,3  32,1 59,8  683,7  2130  
8 Ecuador    123,8  34,4 42,6  416,2  1210  
9 Guatemala    187,4  51,5 96,5  865,2  1680  
10 Honduras    57,9  49,6 28,7  426,6  860  
11 Jamaica    69,9  36,4 25,5  950,0  2610  
12 Mexico    5597,7  30,1 1684,9  1526,1  5070  
13 Nicaragua    21,1  45,2 9,5  180,8  400  
14 Panama    93,7  64,1 60,1  2089,7  3260  
15 Peru    519,2  59,9 311,0  1245,9  2080  
16 Uruguay    193,8  51,1 99,0  3066,0  6000  
17 Venezuela, RB    1193,2  33,6 400,9  1448,2  4310  
 AVERAGE    1083  41  372  1152  3062   
Source: own calculations based on Worldbank data, Washington D.C., 2002. 
 
 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    11 
 
Table 3.4: The size of the shadow and official economy of 23 European and Asian Transformation Countries 
 EUROPE  - 
TRANSFORMATION 
COUNTRIES 
  GNP at market prices 
(current US$, billion) 
2000 
Shadow Economy 
in % of GNP 
1999/2000 
Shadow Economy 
(current USD in 
billion) 2000 
Shadow Economy 
GNP per capita 
(current US$) 
GNP per capita 2000, Atlas 
method (current US$) 
 
1 Albania 
2)   38,6  33,4 12,9  374,1  1120  
2 Armenia    19,3  46,3 8,9  240,8  520  
3 Azerbaijan 
1) 2)    49,2  60,6 29,8  363,6  600  
4 Belarus 
1)   299,6  48,1 144,1  1380,5  2870  
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina 
2)   46,2  34,1 15,8  419,4  1230  
6 Bulgaria    116,7  36,9 43,1  560,9  1520  
7 Croatia    187,2  33,4 62,5  1543,1  4620  
8 Czech Republic    500,1  19,1 95,5  1002,8  5250  
9 Georgia    30,5  67,3 20,5  424,0  630  
10 Hungary    440,6  25,1 110,6  1182,2  4710  
11 Kazakhstan 
1)   170,5  43,2 73,7  544,3  1260  
12 Kyrgyz Republic    12,2  39,8 4,9  107,5  270  
13 Latvia    71,8  39,9 28,6  1165,1  2920  
14 Lithuania    111,2  30,3 33,7  887,8  2930  
15 Moldova 
1) 2)    13,6  45,1 6,1  180,4  400  
16 Poland    1568,2  27,6 432,8  1156,4  4190  
17 Romania    363,8  34,4 125,2  574,5  1670  
18 Russian Federation
 1)   2484,4  46,1 1145,3  779,1  1690  
19 Slovak Republic    187,7  18,9 35,5  699,3  3700  
20 Slovenia    180,7  27,1 49,0  2723,6  10050  
21 Ukraine    308,5  52,2 161,0  365,4  700  
22 Uzbekistan 
1)   74,2  34,1 25,3  122,8  360  
23 Yugoslavia 
2)   84,5  29,1 24,6  273,5  940  
 AVERAGE    320  38  117  742  2354   
1) Still a mostly communist dominated country. 2) Due to civil war and political unrest unreliable figures. 
Source: own calculations based on Worldbank data, Washington D.C., 2002. 
 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    12 
 
3.3  Highly developed OECD-Countries 
 
 
OECD countries typically have a smaller shadow economy than the other country groupings. For 
21 OECD countries the results are not only shown for the year 2000, but also over an extended 
time period, i.e. from 1989 to 2002/2003; the results are presented in table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5 
 
For the 21 OECD countries a combination of the currency demand method with the 
DYMIMIC method is used.
12) Considering again the latest period 2002/2003, Greece has with 
28.3% of official GDP the largest shadow economy, followed by Italy with 26.2%
13) and 
Portugal with 22.3%. In the middle-field are Germany with a shadow economy of 16.8% of 
official GDP, followed by Ireland with 15.5% and France with 14.8% of official GDP. At the 
lower end are Austria with 10.8% of GDP and the United States with 8.6% of official GDP. 
For these OECD countries one realizes over time a remarkable increase of the shadow 
economies during the 90s. On average the shadow economy was 13.2% in these 21 OECD 
states in the year 1989/90 and it rose to 16.4% in the year 2002/2003. If we consider the 
second half of the 90s, we realize that for the majority of OECD countries the shadow 
economy is not further increasing, even (slightly) decreasing, like for Belgium from 22.5% 
(1997/98) to 21.5% (2002/2003), for Denmark from 18.3% (1997/98) to 17.5% (2002/2003) 
or for Finland from 18.9% (1997/98) to 17.6% (2002/2003) or for Italy from 27.3% (1997/98) 
to 26.2% (2002/2003). For others, like Austria, it is still increasing from 9.0% (1997/98) to 
10.8% (2002/2003), or Germany from 14.9% (1997/98) to 16.8% (2002/2003). Hence, one 
can’t draw a general conclusion whether the shadow economy is further increasing or 
decreasing at the end of the 90s. It differs from country to country but in some countries some 
efforts have been made to stabilize the size of the shadow economy and in other countries 
(like Germany) these efforts were not successful up to the year 2003.  
 
                                                           
12) The case of Australia has been extensively investigated by Bajada (2002) and Bajada and Schneider (2003). 
13) An extensive study of the size of the shadow economy of Italy was done by Dell’Anno (2003) and Dell’Anno 
and Schneider (2003), who achieve a similar but somewhat lower magnitude of the Italian shadow economy. 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    13 
 
Table 3.5: The Size of the Shadow Economy in OECD Countries 
Size of the Shadow Economy (in % of GDP) using the Currency Demand and DYMIMIC 
Method 
OECD-Countries  Average 
1989/90 
Average 
1994/95 
Average 
1997/98 
Average 
1999/2000 
Average 
2001/2002 
Average 
2002/2003
1) 
1.  Australia  10.1  13.5  14.0  14.3 14.1 13.8 
2.  Belgium  19.3  21.5  22.5  22.2 22.0 21.5 
3.  Canada  12.8  14.8  16.2  16.0 15.8 15.4 
4.  Denmark  10.8  17.8  18.3  18.0 17.9 17.5 
5.  Germany  11.8  13.5  14.9  16.0 16.3 16.8 
6.  Finland  13.4  18.2  18.9  18.1 18.0 17.6 
7.  France  9.0  14.5  14.9  15.2 15.0 14.8 
8. Greece  22.6  28.6  29.0  28.7 28.5 28.3 
9.  Great  Britain 9.6  12.5  13.0  12.7 12.5 12.3 
10.  Ireland  11.0  15.4  16.2  15.9 15.7 15.5 
11.  Italy  22.8  26.0  27.3  27.1 27.0 26.2 
12.  Japan  8.8  10.6  11.1  11.2 11.1 11.0 
13.  Netherlands 11.9  13.7  13.5  13.1 13.0 12.8 
14. New Zealand
2)  9.2  11.3  11.9  12.8 12.6 12.4 
15.  Norweay  14.8  18.2  19.6  19.1 19.0 18.7 
16. Austria  6.9  8.6  9.0  9.8  10.6  10.8 
17.  Portugal  15.9  22.1  23.1  22.7 22.5 22.3 
18.  Sweden  15.8  19.5  19.9  19.2 19.1 18.7 
19.  Switzerland  6.7  7.8  8.1  8.6 9.4 9.5 
20. Spain 
3)  16.1  22.4  23.1  22.7 22.5 22.3 
21.  USA  6.7  8.8  8.9  8.7 8.7 8.6 
Unweighted Average 
over 21 OECD 
countries 
13.2  15.7  16.7  16.8  16.7  16.4 
 
Sources: Currency demand and DYMIMIC approach, own calculations 
1) Preliminary values. 
2) The figures are calculated using the MIMIC-method and Currency demand approach. Source: Giles 
(1999b). 
3) The figures have been calculated for 1989/90, 1990/93 and 1994/95 from Mauleon (1998) and for 
the later periods own calculations. 
 
 
3.4  Shadow Economy Labor Market 
 
Having examined the size and development of the shadow economy in terms of value added 
over time so far, the analysis now focuses on the „shadow“ labor market, as within the 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    14 
official labor market there is a particularly tight relationship and “social network” between 
people who are active in the shadow economy.
14) Moreover, by definition every activity in the 
shadow economy involves a “shadow” labor market to some extent: Hence, the “shadow 
labor market” includes all cases, where the employees or the employers, or both, occupy a 
„shadow economy position“.
15) Illicit or shadow economy work can take many shapes. The 
underground use of labor may consist of a second job after (or even during) regular working 
hours. A second form is shadow economy work by individuals who do not participate in the 
official labor market. A third component is the employment of people (e.g. clandestine or 
illegal immigrants), who are not allowed to work in the official economy. Empirical research 
on the shadow economy labor market is even more difficult than of the shadow economy on 
the value added, since one has very little knowledge about how many hours an average 
“shadow economy worker” is actually working (from full time to a few hours, only); hence, it 
is not easy to provide empirical facts.
16) 
 
In table 3.6 the estimates for the shadow economy labor force of 7 OECD-countries (Austria, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden) are shown.  
 
Table 3.6 
 
In Austria the shadow economy labor force has reached in the years 1997-1998 500.000 to 
750.000 or 16% of the official labor force (mean value). In Denmark the development of the 
80s and 90s shows that the part of the Danish population engaged in the shadow economy 
ranged from 8.3% of the total labor force (in 1980) to 15.4% in 1994 – quite a remarkable 
increase of the shadow economy labor force; it almost doubled over 15 years. In France (in 
the years 1997/98) the shadow economy labor force reached a size of between 6 and 12% of 
the official labor force or in absolute figures between 1.4 and 3.2 million. In Germany this 
figure rose from 8 to 12% in 1974 to 1982 and to 22% (18 millions) in the year 1997/98. This 
is again a very strong increase in the shadow economy labor force for France and Germany. 
For other countries the amount of the shadow economy labor force is quite large, too: in Italy 
30-48% (1997-1998), Spain 11.5-32% (1997-1998) and Sweden 19.8 % (1997-1998). In the 
                                                           
14)Pioneering work in this area has been done by L. Frey (1972, 1975, 1978, 1980), Cappiello (1986), Lubell 
(1991), Pozo (1996), Bartlett (1998) and Tanzi (1999). 
15) More detailed theoretical information on the labor supply decision in the underground economy is given by 
Lemieux, Fortin, and Fréchette (1994, p.235) who use micro data from a survey conducted in Quebec City 
(Canada). Their empirical findings clearly indicate, that “participation rates and hours worked in the 
underground sector also tend to be inversely related to the number of hours worked in the regular sector“. 
16)For developing countries some literature about the shadow labour market exists, e.g. the latest works by Pozo 
(1996), Loayza (1996), especially Chickering and Salahdine (1991). 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    15 
European Union about 30 million people are engaged in shadow economy activities in the 
year 1997-1998 and in all European OECD-countries 48 million work illicitly.  
 
Finally, in table 3.6 a first and preliminary calculation of the official GNP per capita and the 
shadow economy GDP (working population) per capita is done, shown in US-$. Here one 
realizes immediately that in all countries investigated, the shadow economy GDP per capita is 
much higher - on average in all countries around 30%.
17) In general these very preliminary 
results clearly demonstrate that the shadow economy labor force has reached a remarkable 
size in the developed OECD-countries, too, even when the calculation still might have many 
errors. 
 
4  The Main Causes of Determining the Shadow Economy 
4.1  Tax and Social Security Contribution Burdens 
In almost all studies
18) it has been found out, that the tax and social security contribution 
burdens are one of the main causes for the existence of the shadow economy. Since taxes 
affect labor-leisure choices, and also stimulate labor supply in the shadow economy, the 
distortion of the overall tax burden is a major concern of economists. The bigger the 
difference between the total cost of labor in the official economy and the after-tax earnings 
(from work), the greater is the incentive to avoid this difference and to work in the shadow 
economy. Since this difference depends broadly on the social security burden/payments and 
the overall tax burden, they are key features of the existence and the increase of the shadow 
economy.  
 
But even major tax reforms with major tax rate deductions will not lead to a substantial 
decrease of the shadow economy.
19)  
                                                           
17) This is an astonishing result, which has to be further checked, because in the official per capita GDP figures 
the whole economy is included with quite productive sectors (like electronics, steel, machinery, etc.) and the 
shadow economy figures traditionally contain mostly the service sectors (and the construction sector). Hence 
one could also expect exactly the opposite result, as the productivity in the service sector is usually much lower 
than in the above mentioned ones. Sources of error may be either an underestimation of the shadow economy 
labor force or an overestimation of the shadow economy in terms of value added. 
18) See Thomas (1992); Lippert and Walker (1997); Schneider (1994, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2003b); Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a,1998b); Tanzi (1999); Giles (1999a); Mummert and Schneider (2001); 
Giles and Tedds (2002) and Dell’Anno (2003), just to quote a few recent ones. 
19)See Schneider (1994b, 1998b) for a similar result of the effects of a major tax reform in Austria on the 
shadow economy. Schneider shows that a major reduction in the direct tax burden did not lead to a major 
reduction in the shadow economy. Because legal tax avoidance was abolished and other factors, like regulations, 
were not changed; hence for a considerable part of the tax payers the actual tax and regulation burden remained 
unchanged. 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    16 
Table 3.6: Estimates of the Size of the “Shadow Economy Labor Force” and of the Official and Shadow Economy per capita 1974-1998 
Countries  Year 
 
Official GDP 
per capita in 
US-$
1) 
Shadow 
Economy 
GDP in US-$ 
per capita 
Size of the 
Shadow Economy 
(in % of official 
GDP) Currency 
Demand 
Approach
2) 
Shadow 
Economy 
Labor Force in 
1000 people
3) 
Shadow 
Economy 
Participants in 
% of official 
Labor Force
4) 
Sources of Shadow Economy Labour 
Force 
Austria 90-91 
97-98 
20,636 
25,874 
25,382 
29,630 
5.47 
8.93 
300-380 
500-750 
9.6 
16.0 
Schneider (1998) and  
own calculations 
Denmark  1980  13,233  18,658  8.6  250  8.3  Mogensen, et. al. (1995) 
  1994  34,441  48,562  17.6  420  15.4  and own calculations 
France 1975-82 
1997-98 
12,539 
24,363 
17,542 
34,379 
6.9 
14.9 
800-1500 
1400-3200 
3.0-6.0 
6.0-12.0 
De Grazia (1983) and 
own calculations 
Germany 1974-82 
1997-98 
11,940 
26,080 
17,911 
39,634 
10.6 
14.7 
3000-4000 
7000-9000 
8.0-12.0 
19.0-23.0 
De Grazia (1983), F. Schneider (1998b) 
and own calculations 
Italy 1979 
1997-98 
8,040 
20,361 
11,736 
29,425 
16.7 
27.3 
4000-7000 
6600-11400 
20.0-35.0 
30.0-48.0 
Gaetani and d’Aragona (1979) and 
 own calculations 
Spain 1979-80 
1997-98 
5,640 
13,791 
7,868 
19,927 
19.0 
23.1 
1250-3500 
1500-4200 
9.6-26.5 
11.5-32.3 
Ruesga (1984) and 
own calculations 
Sweden 1978 
1997-98 
15,107 
25,685 
21,981 
37,331 
13.0 
19.8 
750 
1150 
13.0-14.0 
19.8 
De Grazia (1983) and own calculations 
European 
Union 
1978 
1997-98 
9,930 
22,179 
14,458 
32,226 
14.5 
19.6 
15 000 
30 000 
- 
 
De Grazia (1983) and own calculations 
OECD 
(Europe) 
1978 
1997-98 
9,576 
22,880 
14,162 
33,176 
15.0 
20.2 
26 000 
48 000 
-  De Grazia (1983) and own calculations 
1) Source: OECD, Paris, various years 
2) Source: Own calculations. 
3) Estimated full-time jobs, including unregistered workers, illegal immigrants, and second jobs. 
4) In percent of the population aged 20-69, survey method.  
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Such reforms will only be able to stabilize the size of the shadow economy and avoid a further 
increase. Social networks and personal relationships, the high profit from irregular activities 
and associated investments in real and human capital are strong ties which prevent people 
from transferring to the official economy. For Canada, Spiro (1993) found similar reactions of 
people facing an increase in indirect taxes (VAT, GST). This fact makes it even more difficult 
for politicians to carry out major reforms because they may not gain a lot from them. 
The most important factor in neoclassical models is the marginal tax rate. The higher the 
marginal tax rate, the greater is the substitution effect and the bigger the distortion of the 
labor-leisure decision. Especially when taking into account that the individual can also receive 
income in the shadow economy, the substitution effect is definitely larger than the income 
effect and, hence, the individual works less in the official sector. The overall efficiency of the 
economy is, therefore (ceteris paribus), lower and the distortion leads to a welfare loss 
(according to official GNP and taxation.) But according to Thomas (1992, p.134) the welfare 
might also be viewed as increasing, if the welfare of those, who are working in the shadow 
economy, were taken into account, too. 
Empirical results of the influence of the tax burden on the shadow economy is provided in the 
studies of Schneider (1994b, 2000) and Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a, 
1998b); they all found statistically significant evidence for the influence of taxation on the 
shadow economy. This strong influence of indirect and direct taxation on the shadow 
economy will be further demonstrated by discussing empirical results in the case of Austria 
and the Scandinavian countries. For Austria the driving force for the shadow economy 
activities is the direct tax burden (including social security payments), it has the biggest 
influence, followed by the intensity of regulation and complexity of the tax system. A similar 
result has been achieved by Schneider (1986) for the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden). In all three countries various tax variables (average direct tax rate, 
average total tax rate (indirect and direct tax rate)) and marginal tax rates have the expected 
positive sign (on currency demand) and are highly statistically significant. These findings are 
supported by studies of Kirchgaessner (1983, 1984) for Germany and by Kloveland (1984) for 
Norway and Sweden, too. 
Several other recent studies provide further evidence of the influence of income tax rates on 
the shadow economy: Cebula (1997), using Feige data for the shadow economy, found 
evidence of the impact of income tax rates, IRS audit probabilities, and IRS penalty policies 
on the relative size of the shadow economy in the United States. Cebula concludes that a 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    18 
restraint of any further increase of the top marginal income tax rate may at least not lead to a 
further increase of the shadow economy, while increased IRS audits and penalties might 
reduce the size of the shadow economy. For example, if the marginal federal personal income 
tax rate increases by one percentage point, ceteris paribus, the shadow economy rises by 1.4 
percentage points. In another investigation, Hill and Kabir (1996) found empirical evidence 
that marginal tax rates are more relevant than average tax rates, and that a substitution of 
direct taxes by indirect taxes seems unlikely to improve tax compliance. Further evidence on 
the effect of taxation on the shadow economy is presented by Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-
Lobatón (1998b), who come to the conclusion that it is not higher tax rates per se that 
increase the size of the shadow economy, but the ineffective and discretionary application of 
the tax system and the regulations by governments. In their study they find a positive 
correlation between the size of the shadow economy and the corporate tax burden. They come 
to the overall conclusion that there is a large difference between the impact of either direct 
taxes or the corporate tax burden. Institutional aspects, like the efficiency of the 
administration, the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats, and the amount 
of bribery and especially corruption, therefore, play a major role in this “bargaining game“ 
between the government and the taxpayers. 
 
4.2  Intensity of Regulations 
The increase of the intensity of regulations (often measured in the numbers of laws and 
regulations, like licenses requirements) is another important factor, which reduces the 
freedom (of choice) for individuals engaged in the official economy.
20) One can think of labor 
market regulations, trade barriers, and labor restrictions for foreigners. Johnson, Kaufmann, 
and Zoido-Lobatón (1998b) find an overall significant empirical evidence of the influence of 
(labor) regulations on the shadow economy, the impact is clearly described and theoretically 
derived in other studies, e.g. for Germany (Deregulation Commission 1990/91). Regulations 
lead to a substantial increase in labor costs in the official economy. But since most of these 
costs can be shifted on the employees, these costs provide another incentive to work in the 
shadow economy, where they can be avoided. Empirical evidence supporting the model of 
Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997), which predicts, inter alia, that countries with more 
general regulation of their economies tend to have a higher share of the unofficial economy in 
total GDP, is found in their empirical analysis. A one-point increase of the regulation index 
                                                           
20)See for a (social) psychological, theoretical foundation of this feature, Brehm (1966, 1972), and for a (first) 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    19 
(ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 = the most regulation in a country), ceteris paribus, is associated 
with an 8.1 percentage point increase in the share of the shadow economy, when controlled 
for GDP per capita (Johnson et. al. (1998b), p. 18). They conclude that it is the enforcement 
of regulation, which is the key factor for the burden levied on firms and individuals, and not 
the overall extent of regulation - mostly not enforced - which drive firms into the shadow 
economy. Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) reach a similar result. In 
their study every available measure of regulation is significantly correlated with the share of 
the unofficial economy and the sign of the relationship is unambiguous: more regulation is 
correlated with a larger shadow economy. A one point increase in an index of regulation 
(ranging from 1-5) is associated with a 10 % increase in the shadow economy for 76 
developing, transition and developed countries. 
 
These findings demonstrate that governments should put more emphasis on improving 
enforcement of laws and regulations, rather than increasing their number. Some governments, 
however, prefer this policy option (more regulations and laws), when trying to reduce the 
shadow economy, mostly because it leads to an increase in power of the bureaucrats and to a 
higher rate of employment in the public sector. 
4.3  Public Sector Services 
An increase of the shadow economy can lead to reduced state revenues which in turn reduce 
the quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and services. Ultimately, this can lead to 
an increase in the tax rates for firms and individuals in the official sector, quite often 
combined with a deterioration in the quality of the public goods (such as the public 
infrastructure) and of the administration, with the consequence of even stronger incentives to 
participate in the shadow economy. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a,b) 
present a simple model of this relationship. Their findings show that smaller shadow 
economies appear in countries with higher tax revenues, if achieved by lower tax rates, fewer 
laws and regulations and less bribery facing enterprises. Countries with a better rule of the 
law, which is financed by tax revenues, also have smaller shadow economies. Transition 
countries have higher levels of regulation leading to a significantly higher incidence of 
bribery, higher effective taxes on official activities and a large discretionary framework of 
regulations and consequently to a higher shadow economy. Their overall conclusion is that 
“wealthier countries of the OECD, as well as some in Eastern Europe find themselves in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
application to the shadow economy, Pelzmann (1988). 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    20 
‘good equilibrium’ of relatively low tax and regulatory burden, sizeable revenue mobilization, 
good rule of law and corruption control, and [relatively] small unofficial economy. By 
contrast, a number of countries in Latin American and the Former Soviet Union exhibit 
characteristics consistent with a ‘bad equilibrium’: tax and regulatory discretion and burden 
on the firm is high, the rule of law is weak, and there is a high incidence of bribery and a 
relatively high share of activities in the unofficial economy.“ (Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-
Lobatón 1998a p. I). 
5  The Dynamic Effects of the Shadow Economy on Official 
Economy 
5.1 Theoretical  Background 
Generally, the view prevails that the informal sector/the shadow economy influences the tax 
system and its structure, the efficiency of resource allocation between sectors, and the official 
economy as a whole in a dynamic sense. In order to study the effects of the shadow economy 
on the official one, several studies integrate underground economies into theoretical or 
empirical macroeconomic models.
21 For example, Houston (1987) develops a theoretical 
business cycle model, in which there are tax and monetary policy linkages with the shadow 
economy, and concludes that the existence of a shadow economy could lead to an 
overstatement of the inflationary effects of fiscal or monetary stimulus. In an empirical study 
for Belgium Adam and Ginsburgh (1985) focus on the implications of the shadow economy 
on "official" growth and find a positive relationship between the growth of the shadow 
economy and the "official" one and under certain assumptions (i.e. very low entry costs into 
the shadow economy due to a low probability of enforcement). They conclude that an 
expansionary fiscal policy is a positive stimulus for both the formal and informal economies.  
 
Another hypothesis is, that a substantial reduction of the shadow economy leads to a 
significant increase in tax revenues and therefore to a greater quantity and quality of public 
goods and services, which ultimately can stimulate economic growth. Some authors found 
empirical evidence for this hypothesis. Loayza (1996) presents a simple macroeconomic 
endogenous growth model in which production technology depends on congestable public 
services and in which “excessive” taxes and regulations are imposed by governments unable 
to enforce fully compliance. He concludes that an increase in the relative size of the informal 
                                                           
21 For Austria this was done by Schneider, Hofreither, and Neck (1989) and Neck, Hofreither, and Schneider 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    21 
economy reduces economic growth in economies where (1) the statutory tax burden is larger 
than the optimal tax burden and where (2) the enforcement of compliance is weak. The reason 
for this negative correlation is the strongly negative correlation between the informal sector 
and public infrastructure indices, while public-infrastructure is the key element for economic 
growth. Loayza (1996) also finds empirical evidence for Latin America countries that if the 
shadow economy increases by one percentage point (of GDP) - ceteris paribus - the growth 
rate of official real GDP per capita decreases by 1.22 percentage points. However, this 
negative impact of informal sector activities on economic growth is not broadly accepted, e.g. 
by Asea (1996). For example, the Loayza (1996) model is based on the assumption that the 
production technology depends on tax-financed public services, that are subject to congestion 
and that the informal sector is not paying any taxes but must pay penalties that are not used to 
finance public services. The negative correlation between the size of the informal sector and 
economic growth is therefore not very surprising. 
 
Further, in the neoclassical view the underground economy is optimal in the sense that it 
responds to the economic environment's demand for urban services and small-scale 
manufacturing. From this point of view the informal sector provides the economy with a 
dynamic and entrepreneurial spirit and can lead to more competition, higher efficiency, and 
stronger boundaries and limits for government activities. Put it differently, the informal sector 
may help to create markets, increase financial resources, enhance entrepreneurship, and 
transform the legal, social, and economic institutions necessary for accumulation“ (Asea, 
1996 p. 166). The voluntary self-selection between the formal and informal sectors may 
provide a higher potential for economic growth and hence a positive correlation between an 
increase of the informal sector and economic growth. Finally, considering both lines of 
theoretical argumentation, the effects of an increase of the shadow economy on economic 
growth therefore remain considerably ambiguous. It may be that on the one side in highly 
developed countries people/entrepreneurs are overburdened by tax and regulation so that a 
rising shadow economy stimulates/increases the official one as additional value added is 
created and additional income earned in the shadow economy is spent in the official one. On 
the other side in developing countries a rising shadow economy leads to a considerable 
erosion of the tax base with the consequence of a lower provision of public infrastructure and 
basic public service (e.g. an efficient juridical system) and with the final consequence of 
lower official growth. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(1989). For further discussion of this aspect see Quirk (1996) and Giles (1999a). 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    22 
Accordingly, we test empirically the impact of the size of the shadow economy upon 
“official” economic growth. We construct a panel data set for 109 developing, transition, and 
OECD countries for the time period from 1990 to 2000 to estimate the possible effects of the 
shadow economy on the official one. 
Our panel data set consists of variables
22 that the growth theory suggests to be relevant for 
economic growth [Barro et al. 1995 and Breton 2001]. The data set includes such explanatory 
variables as the size of the shadow economy (as percent of “official” GDP), capital 
accumulation, labour force and population growth rates, inflation rates, an indicator for 
openness, figures on foreign direct investment, the corruption index, government expenditures 
and GDP per capita [to control for the convergence hypothesis
23] in order to estimate the 
relationship between economic growth, the shadow economy, and other possible factors. 
5.2 The  Main  Results 
We estimate a basic equation for the entire sample of 109 developing and developed countries 
and variables on this basic equation for the two separate sub-samples of 21 OECD countries 
and 75 developing and transition countries. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the 
average applied growth rate in per capita GDP over the 1990 to 2000 period. Appendix 2 (7.2) 
contains a description of the countries and our variables.  
 
5.2.1  The Sample of 109 Developing and Developed Countries 
Our empirical estimation equation is the following: 
 
“official” economic growth =   a1 (shadow economy industrialized countries) + 
     a2  (shadow  economy  developing  countries)  + 
     a3  (openness)  + 
     a4  (inflation  rate  industrialized  countries)  + 
     a5  (inflation  rate  developed  countries)  + 
     a6  (government  consumption)  + 
     a7  (lagged  GDP  per  capita  growth  rate)  + 
     a8  (total  population)  + 
     a9  (capital  accumulation  rate)  + 
     a10  (constant)  +  εit 
                                                           
22 A description of the countries, variables and sources can be found more detailed in the part 7.2, Appendix at 
the end of this paper. 
23 The convergence theory argues that countries with a lower GDP per capita should have higher annual GDP 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    23 
 
with the expected signs =  a1 > 0, a2 < 0, a3 > 0, a4 < 0, a5 < 0, a6 < 0, a7 > 0, a8 > 0, a9 > 0 
 
Not all of the theoretically relevant variables for economic growth just like expenditures on 
research and development [R&D] as an indicator for technological progress or indicators for 
human capital like school enrollment and number of persons with secondary and tertiary 
education were available
24 for all 109 countries for the regression analysis but the dataset is 
quite adequate for testing the dynamic influence of the shadow economy on the official one. 
 
Putting all possible (for all countries available) variables into an equation explaining 
economic growth did not deliver satisfying results, since many conventionally important 
variables were insignificant. For example labour force growth has no influence on the GDP 
growth rate in the model despite the fact that theory suggests a positive relationship between 
labour force growth and economic growth [Breton 2001]; similarly, neither the corruption 
index ranging from 0 to 10
25 nor foreign direct investment had a statistically significant 
impact on annual GDP growth. 
 
Accordingly, we followed a ‘testing down procedure’
26 to address possible misspecification. 
After testing different model specifications the following model, reported in table 5.1, 
resulted, which is “our best” model. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
growth rates since they are following a catching up process. 
24 Some variables were not available at all but most variables were available only for a small number of 
countries and many observations would have been lost if using the particular variable in the regression analysis 
[for example using patents per year as a proxy variable for expenditures on R&D results in a sample consisting 
only of 30 countries]. The 109 countries are listed in the appendix 2 (part 7.2). 
25 The higher the value of the corruption index, the lower corruption in the observed country. 
26 The ‘testing down procedure’ means that step by step insignificant variables are dropped from the equation 
after carrying out F-tests on joint significance [see Wooldridge 2000, page 139 - 150]. For example the 
coefficient on GDP per capita was insignificant and the convergence theory cannot be supported with the 
available data. 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    24 
Table 5.1.: Results of the Panel Regression; Time period 1990 – 2000, 
104 developing, transition and industrialized countries 
Dependent Variable  Annual GDP per capita Growth Rate 
   
Independent Variables:  Estimated Coefficients: 
   
Shadow Economy Industrialized Countries  0.077** 
  (2.63) 
Shadow Economy Developing Countries  -0.052** 
 (2.37) 
Openness  0.012** 
  (2.14) 
Inflation Rate Other Countries  0.023 
 (1.32) 
Inflation Rate Transition Countries  -0.021** 
  (4.10) 
Government Consumption  -0.181** 
 (3.23) 
Lagged Annual GDP per capita Growth Rate  0.154** 
  (3.06) 
Total Population  0.000036** 
 (2.07) 
Capital Accumulation Rate  0.019* 
  (1.88) 
Constant 0.062** 
 (4.13) 
   
Number of countries  104 
   
Overall R-Squared  0.347 
Within R-Squared  0.266 
Between R-Squared  0.417 
Wald-CHI² 94.63   
 (0.000) 
   
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%.  
Random effects GLS-regressions; 104 countries, period 1990-2000; yearly data 
Source: Own Calculation by authors 
 
This regression clearly shows a highly interesting and statistically significant negative 
relationship between the shadow economy of developing countries and official rate of 
economic growth and a statistically significant positive relationship between the shadow 
economy in industrialized countries and economic growth. If the shadow economy in 
industrialized countries raises by 1 percentage point of GDP (e.g. shadow economy increases 
from 10 of 11 percent of official GDP) official growth increases by 7.7 percent; in contrast, 
for developing countries an increase of the shadow economy by 1 percentage point of official 
GDP is associated with a decrease in the official growth rate by 4.9 percent. Also all other 
variables (except the inflation rate in other countries) have a statistically significant influence 
on growth. For example, the more open a country the higher is official growth and if the 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    25 
inflation rate in transition countries increases by 1 percent official growth decreases by 2.1 
percent. Similarly, an increase in the state sector by 1 percent is a associated with a decreases 
in growth by 1.8 percent. On the other hand, an increase in the total population by 10 million 
leads to an increase in official GDP by 0.36 percent.  
 
In general these results clearly show a statistically significant negative impact of the shadow 
economy of developing countries on the growth rate of the official economy and a positive 
influence of the shadow economy on the growth rate of industrialized countries. All other 
variables have plausible signs and are generally statistically significant on a 5 percent 
confidence level 
5.2.2  21 OECD countries 
When we focus more narrowly on OECD countries, we find similar results. The 21 OECD 
countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Great 
Britain, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Spain, and the USA. As before we estimate a panel regression with the official 
growth rate of GDP per capita of the 1990 up to 2000 period as dependent variable.  
 
For these 21 OECD countries we specify the following growth equation:  
“official” growth (annual GDP per capita) =   a1 (trendvariable) + 
  a2 (shadow economy) + 
  a3 (openness) + 
  a4 (capital accumulation rate) + 
  a5 (annual FDY growth rate) + 
  a6 (annual labour force growth rate) + 
  a7 (constant) + εit 
 
For the signs we expect  a1 > 0, a2 > 0, a3 > 0, a4 > 0, a5 > 0. 
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Table 5.2.: Growth equation for 21 OECD Countries 1990 – 2000; results 
of a Panel regression 
Dependent Variables  Annual GDP per capita Growth Rate 
   
Explanatory Variables:  Estimated coefficients 
   
Trend Variable   -0.003** 
  (3.36) 
Shadow Economy  0.078** 
 (2.05) 
Openness  0.016** 
  (2.47) 
Capital Accumulation Rate  0.127** 
 (3.47) 
Annual FDI Growth Rate  0.004** 
  (2.49) 
Annual Labour Force Growth Rate  0.951** 
 (2.44) 
Constant  6.206** 
  (3.36) 
   
Number of countries  21 
   
Overall R-Squared  0.370 
Within R-Squared  0.213 
Between R-Squared  0.716 
Wald-Chi² 51.10   
 (0.000) 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%;  
** significant at 5%;  
Random effects GLS-regressions; 21 countries, period 1990-2000; yearly data 
Source: Own Calculation by authors 
 
The empirical estimation results are shown in table 5.2. The trend variable clearly has a 
negative and a statistically significant influence on the official growth rate in the OECD 
countries – a result which is not unusual for the period of the 90s for most OECD countries, 
as it reflects the overall poor economic performance of most OECD countries during the 90s. 
Again, the shadow economy has a positive and a statistically significant influence on the 
official growth rate of GDP per capita. An increase in the shadow economy by 1 percentage 
point (of official GDP) is associated with an increase in the annual growth rate of 7.8 percent. 
In addition, increases in the capital accumulation rate by 1 percentage point, lead to an official 
growth by 12.7 percent. If foreign direct investment increases by 1 percentage point, annual 
growth rate increases by 0.4 percent. If the annual labor force rate increases by 1 percent, 
growth rate increases by 9.5 percent.  07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    27 
 
5.2.3  75 Transition and Developing Countries 
Official economy growth of highly industrialized, developing and transition countries may be 
quite different then that of developed and transition countries and the explanatory factors that 
influence the growth rate may also be quite different (due to institutional reasons), we finally 
present an estimation with only developing and transition countries. For these 75 countries we 
specify the following growth equation: 
 
“Official” growth (annual GDP per capita) =  a1 (shadow economy transition countries) + 
  a2 (shadow economy developing countries) + 
  a3 (foreign direct investment lagged) + 
  a4 (inflation rate other countries) + 
  a5 (inflation rate transition countries) + 
  a6 (government consumption) + 
  a7 (lagged annual GDP per capita) + 
  a8 (growth rate) + 
  a9 (population rate) + 
  a10 (capital accumulation rate) + 
  a11 (constant) + εit 
 
For the signs we expect: a1 > 0, a2 < 0, a3 > 0, a4 < 0, a5 < 0, a6 < 0, a7 > 0, a8 > 0, a9 > 0. 
 
The empirical results are shown in table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3.: Results of the Panel Regression; Time period 1990 – 2000, 75 
transition and developing countries 
Dependent Variable  Annual GDP per capita Growth Rate 
   
Independent Variables:  Estimated Coefficients: 
   
Shadow Economy Transition Countries  0.099** 
  (3.80) 
Shadow Economy Developing Countries  -0.045** 
 (-2.36) 
FDI lagged  0.00049 
  (0.05) 
Inflation Rate Other Countries  0.0263 
 (1.28) 
Inflation Rate Transition Countries  -0.021** 
  (-3.69) 
Government Consumption  -0.184** 
 (3.25) 
Lagged Annual GDP per capita Growth Rate  0.154** 
  (3.06) 
Total Population  0.000036* 
 (1.80) 
Capital Accumulation Rate  0.015 
  (1.42) 
Constant 0.067** 
 (5.00) 
   
Number of countries  75 
   
Overall R-Squared  0.3211 
Within R-Squared  0.263 
Between R-Squared  0.443 
Wald-CHI² 73.89   
 (0.000) 
   
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  
Random effects GLS-regressions; 75 countries, period 1990-2000; yearly data 
Source: Own Calculation by authors 
 
Table 5.3 reveals a statistically significant positive influence of the shadow economy of 
transition countries and again a statistically significant negative influence of the shadow 
economy on developing countries (the usual result). In particular, an increase of 1 percent in 
the relative size of the shadow economy in transition countries increases official growth in the 
transition countries by 9.9 percent, and decreases growth in developing countries by 4.5 
percent. As for other variables, the foreign direct investment lagged has no statistically 
insignificant influence. The inflation rate in transition countries has a negative statistically 
significant influence; an increase by 1 percent, leads to a decrease by 2.1 percent in official 
growth. Government consumption or the size of the state sector has again a negative 
statistically significant influence. If the state sector increases by 1 percentage point (in official 
GDP) official growth goes down by 18.4 percent. The lagged annual GPD per capita growth 
rate has a large positive statistically significant influence, and total population also has a 
positive (through small) impact on growth. The capital accumulation is not statistically 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    29 
significant. 
 
In summary, all three sets of regression clearly indicate that the shadow economy has a 
statistically significant influence on official economic growth. For transition countries and 
highly industrialized (OECD) countries this influence is positive, while for developing 
countries the shadow economy has a negative influence on official growth. These results (at 
least partly) confirm our discussion of the theoretical considerations in part 5.1. 
 
6 Summary  and  Conclusions 
There are many obstacles to be overcome to measure the size of the shadow economy and to 
analyze its consequences on the official economy, but as this paper shows some progress has 
been made. We have been shown that though it is difficult to estimate the size of the shadow 
economy. We provided estimates for 110 countries all over the world. We have demonstrated 
that with various methods, e.g. the currency demand, and the model (MIMIC) approach, some 
insights can be provided into the size and development of the shadow economy of the 
developing, transition and the OECD countries. The general impression from the results of 
these methods is that for all countries investigated the shadow economy has reached a 
remarkably large size. The summarized results are shown in table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1:  Average Size of the Shadow Economy for Developing, Transition and 
OECD-Countries in Terms of Value-Added for 2000 
Average Size of the Shadow Economy – 
Value added in % of official GDP 2000 
 
 
Countries  Currency Demand and DYMIMIC method 
(Number of Countries) 
Mostly developing countries:   
Africa 41 
(23) 
Central and South America  41 
(18) 
Asia   29 
(26) 
Transition countries  35 
(23) 
European OECD Countries  18 
(16) 
North American and Pacific OECD 
Countries 
13.5 
(4) 
Source: Own calculations. 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    30 
We have also demonstrated that there is an empirically strong interaction of the shadow 
economy with the official one. From these two major results we draw the following four 
conclusions: 
 
(1) As it has already been argued, there is no „best“ or commonly accepted method; each 
approach has its specific strengths and weaknesses as well as specific insights and 
results. Although the different methods provide a rather wide range of estimates, there 
is a common finding that the size of the shadow economies for developing, transition, 
and OECD countries has been growing over the 1990 to 2000 period.  
(2) Furthermore, the results of our study show that an increasing burden of taxation and 
social security payments, combined with rising state regulatory activities, are the 
major driving forces for the size and growth of the shadow economy.  
(3) A further important result of our study is that the shadow economy has a statistically 
significant and quantitatively important influence on the growth of the official 
economy. If the shadow economy increases by one percentage point (shadow 
economy in percent of official GDP) the official growth in a developing country 
declines between 4.5 and 5.7 percent. For developed (industrialized and /or transition) 
countries we find the opposite result. If the shadow economy increases by one 
percentage point (in % of GDP) the growth rate in industrialized countries increases 
by 7.7 percent and by 9.9 percent in transition countries, respectively. 
(4) Finally, to conclude: Shadow economies are a complex phenomenon, present to an 
important extent in all type of economies (developing, transition and developed). 
People engage in shadow economic activity for a variety of reasons, among most 
important, of which we can count are government actions, most notable taxation and 
regulation. With these two insights, goes a third, no less important one: a government 
aiming to decrease shadow economic activity has to first and foremost analyze the 
complex and frequently contradictory relationships among consequences of its own 
policy decisions. 
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7 Appendices 
7.1  Appendix 1: Methods to Estimate the Size of the Shadow Economy 
As has already been mentioned in chapters 2 and 3 to estimating the size of a shadow 
economy is a difficult and challenging task. In this appendix we give a short but 
comprehensive overview on the various procedures to estimate the size of a shadow economy. 
Three different types of methods are most widely used, and each is briefly discussed. 
7.1.1  Direct Approaches 
These are micro approaches that employ either well designed surveys and samples based on 
voluntary replies or tax auditing and other compliance methods. Sample surveys designed to 
estimate the shadow economy are widely used in a number of countries
27). The main 
disadvantage of this method is that it presents the flaws of all surveys. For example, the 
average precision and results depend greatly on the respondent’s willingness to cooperate, it is 
difficult to asses the amount of undeclared work from a direct questionnaire, most 
interviewers hesitate to confess a fraudulent behavior, and responses are of uncertain 
reliability, which makes it difficult to calculate a real estimate (in monetary terms) of the 
extend of undeclared work. The main advantage of this method lies in the detailed 
information about the structure of the shadow economy, but the results from these kinds of 
surveys are very sensitive to the way the questionnaire is formulated
28). 
 
Estimates of the shadow economy can also be based on the discrepancy between income 
declared for tax purposes and that measured by selective checks. Fiscal auditing programs 
have been particularly effective in this regard. Since these programs are designed to measure 
the amount of undeclared taxable income, they may also be used to calculate the shadow 
economy.
29) However, a number of difficulties beset this approach. First, using tax 
compliance data are equivalent to using a (possibly biased) sample of the population. In 
general, the selection of tax payers for tax audit is not random but based on properties of 
                                                           
27)The direct method of voluntary sample surveys has been extensively used for Norway by Isachsen, Klovland 
and Strom (1982), and Isachsen and Strom (1985). For Denmark this method is used by Mogensen (et. al., 1995) 
in which they report „estimates“ of the shadow economy of 2.7 percent of GDP for 1989, of 4.2 percent of GDP 
for 1991, of 3.0 percent of GDP for 1993 and of 3.1 percent of GDP for 1994.  
28)The advantages and disadvantages of this method are extensively dealt by Mogensen et. al (1995) in their 
excellent and very carefully done investigation. 
29)In the United States, IRS (1979, 1983), Simon and Witte (1982), Witte (1987), Clotefelter (1983), and Feige 
(1986). For a more detailed discussion, see Dallago (1990) and Thomas (1992). 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    32 
submitted (tax) returns that indicate a certain likelihood of (tax) fraud. Consequently, such a 
sample is not a random one of the whole population, and estimates of the shadow based upon 
a biased sample may not be accurate. Second estimates based on tax audits reflect only that 
portion of shadow economy income that the authorities succeed in discovering, and this is 
likely to be only a fraction of hidden income. 
 
A further disadvantage of these two direct methods (surveys and tax auditing) is that they lead 
only to point estimates. Moreover, it is unlikely that they capture all „shadow“ activities, so 
they can be seen as providing lower bound estimates. They are unable to provide estimates of 
the development and growth of the shadow economy over a longer period of time. As already 
argued, they have, however at least one considerable advantage - they can provide detailed 
information about shadow economy activities and the structure and composition of those who 
work in the shadow economy. 
7.1.2  Indirect Approaches 
These approaches, which are also called „indicator“ approaches, are mostly macroeconomic 
ones and use various economic and other indicators that contain information about the 
development of the shadow economy (over time). Currently there are five indicators that 
leave some „traces“ of the shadow economy.  
 
7.1.2.1  The Discrepancy between National Expenditure and Income Statistics 
This approach is based on discrepancies between income and expenditure statistics. In 
national accounting the income measure of GNP should be equal to the expenditure measure 
of GNP. Thus, if an independent estimate of the expenditure site of the national accounts is 
available, the gap between the expenditure measure and the income measure can be used as an 
indicator of the extent of the black economy.
30) Since national accounts statisticians are 
anxious to minimize this discrepancy, the initial discrepancy or first estimate, rather than the 
published discrepancy should be employed as an estimate of the shadow economy. If all the 
components of the expenditure site are measured without error, then this approach would 
indeed yield a good estimate of the scale of the shadow economy. Unfortunately, however, 
this is not the case. Instead, the discrepancy reflects all omissions and errors everywhere in 
                                                           
30) See, e.g., Franz (1983) for Austria; MacAfee (1980) O’Higgins (1989) and Smith (1985), for Great Britain; 
Petersen (1982) and Del Boca (1981) for Germany; Park (1979) for the United States. For a critical survey, see 
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the national accounts statistics as well as the shadow economy activity. These estimates may 
therefore be very crude and of questionable reliability.
31)  
7.1.2.2  The Discrepancy between the Official and Actual Labor Force  
A decline in participation of the labor force in the official economy can be seen as an 
indication of increased activity in the shadow economy. If total labor force participation is 
assumed to be constant, than a decreasing official rate of participation can be seen as an 
indicator of an increase in the activities in the shadow economy, ceteris paribus.
32) One 
weakness of this method is that differences in the rate of participation may also have other 
causes. Also, people can work in the shadow economy and have a job in the „official’ 
economy. Therefore such estimates may be viewed as weak indicators of the size and 
development of the shadow economy. 
7.1.2.3  The Transactions Approach 
This approach has been most fully developed by Feige.
33) It is based upon the assumption, 
that there is a constant relation over time between the volume of transaction and official GNP, 
as summarized by the well-known Fisherian quantity equation, or M*V = p*T (with M = 
money, V = velocity, p = prices, and T = total transactions). Assumptions also have to be 
made about the velocity of money and about the relationships between the value of total 
transactions (p*T) and total (=official + unofficial) nominal GNP. Relating total nominal 
GNP to total transactions, the GNP of the shadow economy can be calculated by subtracting 
the official GNP from total nominal GNP. However, to derive figures for the shadow 
economy, one must also assume a base year in which there is no shadow economy and 
therefore the ratio of p*T to total nominal (official = total) GNP was „normal“ and would 
have been constant over time, if there had been no shadow economy.  
 
This method, too, has several weaknesses, such as the required assumptions of a base year 
with no shadow economy, and of a „normal“ ratio of transactions to nominal GNP. Moreover, 
to obtain reliable shadow economy estimates, precise figures of the total volume of 
transactions should be available, and this availability might be especially difficult to achieve 
for cash transactions, because they depend, among other factors, on the durability of bank 
notes in terms of the quality of the papers on which they are printed.
34) Also, the assumption 
                                                           
31) A related approach is pursued by Pissarides and Weber (1988), who use micro data from household budget 
surveys to estimate the extend of income understatement by self-employed. 
32) Such studies have been made for Italy, see e.g., Contini (1981) and Del Boca (1981); for the United States, 
see O’Neill (1983), for a critical survey, see again Thomas (1992). 
33) For an extended description of this approach, see Feige (1996); for a further application for the Netherlands, 
Boeschoten and Fase (1984), and for Germany, Langfeldt (1984). 
34)For a detailed criticism of the transaction approach see Boeschoten and Fase (1984), Frey and Pommerehne 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    34 
is made that all variations in the ratio between the total value of transaction and the officially 
measured GNP are due to the shadow economy. This means that a considerable amount of 
data is required in order to eliminate financial transactions from “pure” cross payments, which 
are legal and have nothing to do with the shadow economy. In general, although this approach 
is theoretically attractive, the empirical requirements necessary to obtain reliable estimates are 
so difficult to fulfill, that its application may lead to doubtful results. 
7.1.2.4  The Currency Demand Approach 
The currency demand approach was first used by Cagan (1958), who calculated a correlation 
of the currency demand and the tax pressure (as one cause of the shadow economy) for the 
United States over the period 1919 to 1955. 20 years later, Gutmann (1977) used the same 
approach but without any statistical procedures. Cagan’s approach was further developed by 
Tanzi (1980, 1983), who econometrically estimated a currency demand function for the 
United States for the period 1929 to 1980 in order to calculate the shadow economy. His 
approach assumes that shadow (or hidden) transactions are undertaken in the form of cash 
payments, so as to leave no observable traces for the authorities. An increase in the size of the 
shadow economy will therefore increase the demand for currency. To isolate the resulting 
„excess“ demand for currency, an equation for currency demand is econometrically estimated 
over time. All conventional possible factors, such as the development of income, payment 
habits, interest rates, and so on, are controlled for. Additionally, such variables as the direct 
and indirect tax burden, government regulation and the complexity of the tax system, which 
are assumed to be the major factors causing people to work in the shadow economy, are 
included in the estimation equation. The basic regression equation for the currency demand, 
proposed by Tanzi (1983), is the following:  
 
ln (C / M2)t = βO + β1 ln (1 + TW)t + β2 ln (WS / Y)t + β3 ln Rt + β4 ln (Y / N)t + ut 
with β1 > 0, β2 > 0, β3 < 0, β4 > 0 
 
where  
 
ln denotes natural logarithms,  
C / M2 is the ratio of cash holdings to current and deposit accounts,  
TW is a weighted average tax rate (to proxy changes in the size of the shadow economy),  
WS / Y is a proportion of wages and salaries in national income (to capture changing payment 
and money holding patterns),  
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R is the interest paid on savings deposits (to capture the opportunity cost of holding cash) and  
Y / N is the per capita income.
35)  
 
Any „excess“ increase in currency, or the amount unexplained by the conventional or normal 
factors (mentioned above) is then attributed to the rising tax burden and the other reasons 
leading people to work in the shadow economy. Figures for the size and development of the 
shadow economy can be calculated in a first step by comparing the difference between the 
development of currency when the direct and indirect tax burden (and government 
regulations) are held at its lowest value, and the development of currency with the current 
(much higher) burden of taxation and government regulations. Assuming in a second step the 
same income velocity for currency used in the shadow economy as for legal M1 in the official 
economy, the size of the shadow can be computed and compared to the official GDP. 
 
The currency demand approach is one of the most commonly used approaches. It has been 
applied to many OECD countries,
36) but has nevertheless been criticized on various 
grounds.
37) The most commonly raised objections to this method are several:  
 
(i)  Not all transactions in the shadow economy are paid in cash. Isachsen and Strom 
(1985) used the survey method to find out that in Norway, in 1980, roughly 80 percent 
of all transactions in the hidden sector were paid in cash. The size of the total shadow 
economy (including barter) may thus be even larger than previously estimated. 
(ii)  Most studies consider only one particular factor, the tax burden, as a cause of the 
shadow economy. But others (such as the impact of regulation, taxpayers’ attitudes 
toward the state, „tax morality“ and so on) are not considered, because reliable data 
for most countries is not available. If, as seems likely, these other factors also have an 
impact on the extent of the hidden economy, it might again be higher than reported in 
most studies.
38) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(1999a). 
35) The estimation of such a currency demand equation has been criticized by Thomas (1999) but part of this 
criticism has been considered by the work of Giles (1999a, 1999b) and Bhattacharyya (1999), who both use the 
latest econometric technics. 
36)See Karmann (1986 and 1990), Schneider (1997, 1998a), Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a), 
and Williams and Windebank (1995).  
37)See Thomas (1992, 1999), Feige (1986), and Pozo (1996). 
38)One (weak) justification for the only use of the tax variable is that this variable has by far the strongest impact 
on the size of the shadow economy in the studies known to the authors. The only exception is the study by Frey 
and Weck-Hannemann (1984) where the variable „tax immorality“ has a quantitatively larger and statistically 
stronger influence than the direct tax share in the model approach. In the study of Pommerehne and Schneider 
(1985), for the U.S., besides various tax measures, data for regulation, tax immorality, minimum wage rates are 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    36 
(iii)  As discussed by Garcia (1978), Park (1979), and Feige (1996), increases in currency 
demand deposits are due largely to a slowdown in demand deposits rather than to an 
increase in currency caused by activities in the shadow economy, at least in the case of 
the United States.  
(iv)  Blades (1982) and Feige (1986, 1996), criticize Tanzi’s studies on the grounds that the 
US dollar is used as an international currency. Instead, Tanzi should have considered 
(and controlled for) the presence of US dollars, which are used as an international 
currency and held in cash abroad.
39) Moreover, Frey and Pommerehne (1984) and 
Thomas (1986, 1992, 1999) claim that Tanzi’s parameter estimates are not very 
stable.
40) 
(v)  Most studies assume the same velocity of money in both types of economies. As 
argued by Hill and Kabir (1996) for Canada and by Klovland (1984) for the 
Scandinavian countries, there is already considerable uncertainty about the velocity of 
money in the official economy, and the velocity of money in the hidden sector is even 
more difficult to estimate. Without knowledge about the velocity of currency in the 
shadow economy, one has to accept the assumption of an „equal“ money velocity in 
both sectors. 
(vi)  Finally, the assumption of no shadow economy in a base year is open to criticism. 
Relaxing this assumption would again imply an upward adjustment of the size of the 
shadow economy. 
 
7.1.2.5  The Physical Input (Electricity Consumption) Method 
(1) The Kaufmann - Kaliberda Method
41) 
To measure overall (official and unofficial) economic activity in an economy, Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996) assume that electric-power consumption is regarded as the single best 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
available, the tax variable has a dominating influence and contributes roughly 60-70 percent to the size of the 
shadow economy. See also Zilberfarb (1986). 
39) In another study by Tanzi (1982, esp. pp. 110-113) he explicitly deals with this criticism. A very careful 
investigation of the amount of US-$ used abroad and the US currency used in the shadow economy and to 
"classical" crime activities has been undertaken by Rogoff (1998), who concludes that large denomination bills 
are major driving force for the growth of the shadow economy and classical crime activities due largely to 
reduced transactions costs. 
40) However in studies for European countries Kirchgaessner (1983, 1984) and Schneider (1986) reach the 
conclusion that the estimation results for Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are quite robust when using 
the currency demand method. Hill and Kabir (1996) find for Canada that the rise of the shadow economy varies 
with respect to the tax variable used; they conclude „when the theoretically best tax rates are selected and a range 
of plausible velocity values is used, this method estimates underground economic growth between 1964 and 
1995 at between 3 and 11 percent of GDP.“ (Hill and Kabir [1996, p. 1553]).  
41)This method was used earlier by Lizzeri (1979), Del Boca and Forte (1982), and then was used much later by 
Portes (1996), Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997). For a critique see 
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physical indicator of overall (or official plus unofficial) economic activity. Now, overall 
economic activity and electricity consumption have been empirically observed throughout the 
world to move in lockstep with an electricity to GDP elasticity usually close to one. This 
means, that the growth of total electricity consumption is an indicator for growth of overall 
(official and unofficial) GDP. By having this proxy measurement for the overall economy and 
then subtracting from this overall measure the estimates of official GDP, Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996) derive an estimate of unofficial GDP. This method is very simple and 
appealing. However, it can also be criticized on various grounds: 
 
(i)  Not all shadow economy activities require a considerable amount of electricity (e.g. 
personal services), and other energy sources can be used (gas, oil, coal, etc.). Only a 
part of the shadow economy will be captured. 
(ii)  Over time, there has been considerable technical progress, so that both the production 
and use of electricity are more efficient than in the past, and this will apply in both 
official and unofficial uses. 
(iii)  There may be considerable differences or changes in the elasticity of electricity/GDP 
across countries and over time.
42) 
 
(2) The Lackó Method 
Lackó (1996, 1998, 1999, 2000) assumes that a certain part of the shadow economy is 
associated with the household consumption of electricity. This part comprises the so-called 
household production, do-it-yourself activities, and other non registered production and 
services. Lackó further assumes that in countries where the portion of the shadow economy 
associated with the household electricity consumption is high, the rest of the hidden economy 
(or the part Lackó cannot measure) will also be high. Lackó (1996, pp.19 ff.) assumes that in 
each country a part of the household consumption of electricity is used in the shadow 
economy.  
 
Lackó’s approach (1998, p.133) can be described by the following two equations: 
ln Ei =  α1 ln Ci + α2 ln PRi + α3 Gi + α4 Qi + α5 Hi + ui (1) 
with     α1 > 0, α2 < 0, α3 > 0, α4 < 0, α5 > 0 
Hi =  β1 Ti + β2 (Si – Ti) + β3 Di     (2) 
with β1 > 0, β2 < 0, β3 > 0 
where 
                                                           
42)Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997) make an attempt to adjust for changes in the elasticity of 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    38 
i: the number assigned to the country, 
Ei: per capita household electricity consumption in country i in Mtoe, 
Ci: per capita real consumption of households without the consumption of electricity in 
country i in US dollars (at purchasing power parity), 
PRi: the real price of consumption of 1 kWh of residential electricity in US dollars (at 
purchasing power parity), 
Gi: the relative frequency of months with the need of heating in houses in country i, 
Qi: the ratio of energy sources other than electricity energy to all energy sources in household 
energy consumption, 
Hi: the per capita output of the hidden economy, 
Ti: the ratio of the sum of paid personal income, corporate profit and taxes on goods and 
services to GDP, 
Si: the ratio of public social welfare expenditures to GDP, and 
Di: the sum on number of dependants over 14 years and of inactive earners, both per 100 
active earners. 
 
In a cross country study, she econometrically estimates equation (1) substituting Hi by 
equation (2). The econometric estimation results can then be used to establish an ordering of 
the countries with respect to electricity use in their respective shadow economies. For the 
calculation of the actual size (value added) of the shadow economy, Lackó further must know 
how much GDP is produced by one unit of electricity in the shadow economy of each 
country. Since these data are not known, she takes the result of one of the known shadow 
economy estimations, that were carried out for a market economy with another approach for 
the early 1990s, and she applies this proportion to the other countries. Lackó used the shadow 
economy of the United States as such a base (the shadow economy value of 10.5% of GDP 
taken from Morris(1993)), and then she calculates the size of the shadow economy for other 
countries. Lackó's method is also open to criticism: 
(i)  Not all shadow economy activities require a considerable amount of electricity and 
other energy sources can be used. 
(ii)  Shadow economy activities do not take place only in the household sector. 
(iii)  It is doubtful whether the ratio of social welfare expenditures can be used as the 
explanatory factor for the shadow economy, especially in transition and developing 
countries. 
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(iv)  It is questionable which is the most reliable base value of the shadow economy in 
order to calculate the size of the shadow economy for all other countries, especially, 
for the transition and developing countries.  
 
7.1.3  The model approach
43 
All methods described so far that are designed to estimate the size and development of the 
shadow economy consider just one indicator that “must” capture all effects of the shadow 
economy. However, it is obvious that shadow economy effects show up simultaneously in the 
production, labor, and money markets. An even more important critique is that the causes that 
determine the size of the shadow economy are taken into account only in some of the 
monetary approach studies that usually consider one cause, the burden of taxation. The model 
approach explicitly considers multiple causes leading to the existence and growth of the 
shadow economy, as well as the multiple effects of the shadow economy over time.  
 
The empirical method used is quite different from those used so far. It is based on the 
statistical theory of unobserved variables, which considers multiple causes and multiple 
indicators of the phenomenon to be measured. For the estimation, a factor-analytic approach 
is used to measure the hidden economy as an unobserved variable over time. The unknown 
coefficients are estimated in a set of structural equations within which the “unobserved” 
variable cannot be measured directly. The DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-
causes) model consists in general of two parts, with the measurement model linking the 
unobserved variables to observed indicators.
44) The structural equations model specifies 
causal relationships among the unobserved variables. In this case, there is one unobserved 
variable, or the size of the shadow economy; this is assumed to be influenced by a set of 
indicators for the shadow economy’s size, thus capturing the structural dependence of the 
shadow economy on variables that may be useful in predicting its movement and size in the 
future. The interaction over time between the causes Zit (i = 1, 2, ..., k) the size of the shadow 
economy Xt, in time t and the indicators Yjt (j = 1, 2, ..., p) is shown in Figure 7.1. 
 
                                                           
43)This summary is derived from a longer study by Aigner, Schneider, and Ghosh (1988, p. 303), applying this 
approach for the United States over time; for Germany this approach has been applied by Karmann (1986 and 
1990). The pioneers of this approach are Weck (1983), Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984), who applied this 
approach to cross-section data from the 24 OECD countries for various years. Before turning to this approach 
they developed the concept of „soft modeling“ (Frey, Weck, and Pommerehne (1982), Frey and Weck (1983a 
and 1983b)), an approach which has been used to provide a ranking of the relative size of the shadow economy 
in different countries. 
44) One of the latest paper dealing extensively with the DYMIMIC approach, its development and its weaknesses 
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Figure 7.1: Development of the shadow economy over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a large body of literature
45) on the possible causes and indicators of the shadow 
economy, in which the following three types of causes are distinguished: 
Causes 
(i)  The burden of direct and indirect taxation, both actual and perceived. A rising burden 
of taxation provides a strong incentive to work in the shadow economy. 
(ii)  The burden of regulation as proxy for all other state activities. It is assumed that 
increases in the burden of regulation give a strong incentive to enter the shadow 
economy. 
(iii)  The „tax morality“ (citizens’ attitudes toward the state), which describes the readiness 
of individuals (at least partly) to leave their official occupations and enter the shadow 
economy: it is assumed that a declining tax morality tends to increase the size of the 
shadow economy.
46) 
Indicators 
A change in the size of the shadow economy may be reflected in the following indicators: 
(i)  Development of monetary indicators. If activities in the shadow economy rise, 
additional monetary transactions are required. 
                                                           
45)Thomas (1992); Schneider (1994a, 1997, 2003b); Pozo (1996); Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón 
(1998a, 1998b); Giles (1999a, 1999b); Giles and Tedds (2002), and Dell’Anno (2003).. 
46) When applying this approach for European countries, Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) had the difficulty in 
obtaining reliable data for the cause series, besides the ones of direct and indirect tax burden. Hence, their study 
was criticized by Helberger and Knepel (1988), who argue that the results were unstable with respect to 
changing variables in the model and over the years. 
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(ii)  Development of the labor market. Increasing participation of workers in the hidden 
sector results in a decrease in participation in the official economy. Similarly, 
increased activities in the hidden sector may be expected to be reflected in shorter 
working hours in the official economy. 
(iii)  Development of the production market. An increase in the shadow economy means 
that inputs (especially labor) move out of the official economy (at least partly), and 
this displacement might have a depressing effect on the official growth rate of the 
economy. 
 
The latest use of the model approach has been undertaken by Giles (1999a, 1999b) and by 
Giles, Linsey and Gupsa (1999), Giles and Tedd (2002), Chatterjee, Chaudhury and Schneider 
(2002) and Bajada and Schneider (2003). They basically estimates a comprehensive 
(dynamic) MIMIC model to get a time serious index of the hidden/measured output of New 
Zealand, Canada, India or Australia, and then estimate a separate “cash-demand model” to 
obtain a benchmark for converting this index into percentage units. Unlike earlier empirical 
studies of the hidden economy, they paid proper attention to the non-stationary, and possible 
co-integration of time serious data in both models. Again this DYMIMIC model treats hidden 
output as a latent variable, and uses several (measurable) causal variables and indicator 
variables. The former include measures of the average and marginal tax rates, inflation, real 
income and the degree of regulation in the economy. The latter include changes in the (male) 
labor force participation rate and in the cash/money supply ratio. In their cash-demand 
equation they allow for different velocities of currency circulation in the hidden and recorded 
economies. Their cash-demand equation is not used as an input to determine the variation in 
the hidden economy over time – it is used only to obtain the long-run average value of 
hidden/measured output, so that the index for this ratio predicted by the DYMIMIC model 
can be used to calculate a level and the percentage units of the shadow economy. Overall, this 
latest combination of the currency demand and DYMIMIC approach clearly shows that some 
progress in the estimation technique of the shadow economy has been achieved and a number 
of critical points have been overcome. 
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7.2  Appendix 2: Data Set and Detailed Estimation result 
7.2.1  Countries 
The following Table 7.1 presents the 109 countries in the sample and the two data of most 
interest: the size of the shadow economy in percent of GDP for the year 2000 and the annual 
GDP Growth Rate in percent again for the year 2000. 
Table 7.1.: List of countries investigated 
Country  Shadow Economy 2000  GDP Growth Rate 2000 
Albania 33.4  9.15 
Algeria 34.1  5.05 
Argentina 25.4  1.77 
Armenia 46.3  8.16 
Australia 15.3  4.21 
Austria 10.2  5.34 
Azerbaijan 60.6  20.37 
Bangladesh 35.6  8.58 
Belarus 48.1  8.30 
Belgium 23.2  6.13 
Benin 45.2  8.42 
Bolivia 67.1  5.04 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  34.1  0.00 
Botswana 33.4  -2.06 
Brazil 39.8  7.68 
Bulgaria 36.9  9.30 
Burkina Faso  38.4  4.66 
Cameroon 32.8  8.45 
Canada 16.4  6.17 
Chile 19.8  8.51 
China 13.1  9.92 
Colombia 39.1  1.04 
Costa Rica  26.2  -0.37 
Cote d'Ivoire  39.9  0.77 
Croatia 33.4  5.96 
Czech Republic  19.1  5.47 
Denmark 18.2  6.34 
Dominican Republic  32.1  9.86 
Ecuador 34.4  3.98 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  35.1  7.73 
Ethiopia 40.3  8.01 
Finland 18.3  7.91 
France 15.3  5.32 
Georgia 67.3  8.20 
Germany 16.3  5.24 
Ghana 38.4  7.03 
Greece 28.6  7.18 
Guatemala 51.5  6.03 
Honduras 49.6  6.52 
Hong Kong, China  16.6  14.26 
Hungary 25.1  7.63 
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Table 7.1.: List of countries investigated – cont. 
Country  Shadow Economy 2000  GDP Growth Rate 2000 
India 23.1  6.35 
Indonesia 19.4  6.96 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  18.9  7.14 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  18.9  7.14 
Ireland 15.8  15.67 
Israel 21.9  10.64 
Italy 27.0  5.25 
Jamaica 36.4  4.10 
Japan 11.3  4.78 
Jordan 19.4  4.57 
Kazakhstan 43.2  16.14 
Kenya 34.3  1.82 
Korea, Rep.  27.5  10.43 
Kyrgyz Republic  39.8  7.70 
Latvia 39.9  7.87 
Lebanon 34.1  2.03 
Lithuania 30.3  5.52 
Madagascar 39.6  8.06 
Malawi 40.3  4.25 
Malaysia 31.1  14.61 
Mali 41.0  6.86 
Mexico 30.1  9.09 
Moldova 45.1  1.56 
Mongolia 18.4  3.88 
Morocco 36.4  2.60 
Mozambique 40.3  4.89 
Nepal 38.4  8.62 
Netherlands 13.0  5.94 
New Zealand  12.7  4.86 
Nicaragua 45.2  7.25 
Niger 41.9  2.45 
Nigeria 57.9  6.89 
Norway 19.1  4.45 
Pakistan 36.8  7.05 
Panama 64.1  2.27 
Peru 59.9  5.31 
Philippines 43.4  6.28 
Poland 27.6  6.32 
Portugal 22.6  6.00 
Romania 34.4  3.74 
Russian Federation  46.1  8.81 
Saudi Arabia  18.4  8.86 
Senegal 43.2  8.08 
Singapore 13.1  13.76 
Slovak Republic  18.9  4.90 
Slovenia 27.1  7.24 
South Africa  28.4  5.58 
Spain 22.6  6.30 
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Table 7.1.: List of countries investigated – cont. 
Country  Shadow Economy 2000  GDP Growth Rate 2000 
Sri Lanka  44.6  8.73 
Sweden 19.1  6.17 
Switzerland 8.8  5.37 
Syrian Arab Republic  19.3  7.52 
Tanzania 58.3  7.00 
Thailand 52.6  5.18 
Tunisia 38.4  7.42 
Turkey 32.1  10.05 
Uganda 43.1  5.90 
Ukraine 52.2  8.48 
United Arab Emirates  26.4  0.00 
United Kingdom  12.6  5.97 
United States  8.7  7.44 
Uruguay 51.1  1.24 
Uzbekistan 34.1  7.86 
Venezuela, RB  33.6  5.06 
Vietnam 15.6  7.93 
Yemen, Rep.  27.4  12.64 
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep.  29.1  0.00 
Zambia 48.9  4.86 
Zimbabwe 59.4  -5.58 
 
 
7.2.2  Definition of the Variables 
7.2.2.1  General Information 
 
(1) All calculations and estimations are based on the software package ‘Intercooled Stata 
8.0’. 
(2) All growth rates or shares as described in the following section. For example a growth 
rate of 2 percent is defined as 0.02 instead of 2.0. 
(3) If for some reasons observations for important countries for one year are missing we 
used the following formula to calculate the average growth rate for these variables: 
 
 
1
n
tn
t
variable
growth rate
variable
+ 
=∅ 

  [A.1] 
 
Multiplying the value of the variable from year t with the average growth rate gives the value 
for t+1. Formally: 
 
  1 tt growth rate variable variable + ∅× =   [A.2] 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    45 
 
(4) In parenthesis the Stata-Labels for the several variables are presented. This is 
necessary for understanding the regression outputs in detail below in this appendix. 
 
 
7.2.2.2  Definition of the Variables 
 
(1)  GDP per capita on PPP basis [gdpc] 
GDP per capita is based on purchasing power parity [PPP]. PPP GDP is gross domestic 
product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An 
international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the 
United States. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy 
plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current dollars. 
Source: World Bank, International Comparison Programme database. 
 
(2)  Annual GDP per capita Growth Rate [growgdpc] 
Out of this GDP per capita values for the observed 109 countries over the years 1990 to 2000 
the dependent variable Annual GDP per capita Growth Rate has been calculated using the 
formula 
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=   [A.3] 
Source: World Bank, International Comparison Programme database; own calculation by 
authors. 
 
(3)  Shadow Economy [shad] 
The variable Shadow Economy is defined as the informal sector [shadow economy] in percent 
of official GDP. The estimations for the size of the shadow economy are undertaken using the 
DYMIMIC and the currency demand approaches [see Schneider et al. 2002 and Schneider 
2003]. But one has to keep in mind that this variable is only available for three points in time 
namely the years 1990, 1995 and 2000. 
Source: Own calculation by authors. 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    46 
(4)  Shadow Economy Industrialized Countries [shadind] 
The variable Shadow Economy Industrialized Countries is defined as the informal sector 
[shadow economy] in percent of official GDP. It has the value 0 if a country is a developing 
country [indicated by the value 0 in the Dummy Industrialized Countries] and the value of the 
shadow economy in percent of GDP if a country is an industrialized country [indicated by the 
value 1 in the Dummy Industrialized Countries] or a transition country [indicated by the value 
1 in the Dummy Transition Countries].  
Source: Own calculation by authors. 
 
(5)  Shadow Economy Developing Countries [shaddev] 
The variable Shadow Economy Developing Countries is defined as the informal sector 
[shadow economy] in percent of official GDP. It has the value 0 if a country is an 
industrialized country [indicated by the value 1 in the Dummy Industrialized Countries] or a 
transition country [indicated by the value 1 in the Dummy Transition Countries] and the value 
of the shadow economy in percent of GDP if a country is a developing country [indicated by 
the value 0 in the Dummy Industrialized Countries]. 
Source: Own calculation by authors. 
 
(6)  Openness [open] 
Openness is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product. 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
 
(7)  Inflation Rate [infl] 
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator which shows the 
rate of price change in the economy as a whole. 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
 
(8)  Inflation Rate Other Countries [inflrest] 
Inflation Rate Other Countries is equally defined to Inflation Rate but has the value 0 if a 
country is a transition country [indicated by the value 1 in the Dummy Transition Countries] 
and the value of the inflation rate if a country is a non-transition country [indicated by the 
value 0 in the Dummy Transition Countries]. 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    47 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files; own 
calculation by authors. 
 
(9)  Inflation Rate Transition Countries [infltran] 
Inflation Rate Transition Countries is equally defined to Inflation Rate but has the value 0 if a 
country is a non-transition country [indicated by the value 0 in the Dummy Transition 
Countries] and the value of the inflation rate if a country is a transition country [indicated by 
the value 1 in the Dummy Transition Countries]. 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files; own 
calculation by authors. 
 
(10) Government Consumption [gov] 
Government Consumption is defined as general government final consumption expenditure 
and includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services 
(including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national 
defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of 
government capital formation. 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
 
(11) Lagged GDP per capita Growth Rate [lastgrowth] 
This variable is the Annual GDP per capita Growth Rate lagged for one period, thus in our 
case lagged for one year. 
Source: Equal to [growgdpc]; own calculation by authors. 
 
(12) Total Population in millions [pop] 
Total population in millions is based on the population, including all residents who have a 
legal status or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of 
asylum.  
Source: World Bank staff estimates from various sources including the United Nations 
Statistics Division's Population. 
 
(13) Capital Accumulation Rate [caac] 
The Capital Accumulation Rate is the annual growth rate of gross capital formation based on 
local currency. Aggregates are based on 1995 U.S. dollars. Gross capital formation (formerly 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    48 
gross domestic investment) consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy 
plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, 
ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction 
of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential 
dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by 
firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in 
progress." According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered 
capital formation. 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
 
(14) Dummy Industrialized Countries [ind] 
The variable Dummy Industrialized Countries is a binary variable and takes the value 0 if a 
country is a developing country and 1 if the country is an industrialized country. “Developing 
Country” corresponds to high income classification of World Bank Indicators 2002 with per 
capita income of USD 9,265 or less. The same applies to “Industrialized Countries” which are 
defined as countries with per capita GDP of USD 9,266 or more. 
Source: Own calculation by authors. 
 
(15) Dummy Transition countries [tran] 
The variable Dummy Transition Countries is a binary variable and takes the value 1 if a 
country is a transition country from a centrally planned economy to a market economy and 0 
if the country is not. 
Source: Own Calculation by authors. 
 
(16) Dummy OECD countries [oecd] 
The variable Dummy OECD countries is a binary variable and takes the value 1 if a country is 
member of the OECD and 0 if the country is not. 
Source: Own Calculation by authors. 
 
(17) Foreign Direct Investment [fdi] 
Foreign direct investment is the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management 
interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other 
than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    49 
term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows 
net inflows in the reporting economy. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of 
Payments databases, World Bank, Global Development Finance, and World Bank and OECD 
GDP estimates. 
 
(18) Annual FDI Growth Rate [fdigrowth] 
Out of this FDI values for the observed 109 countries over the years 1990 to 2000 the 
explanatory variable Annual FDI Growth Rate has been calculated using the formula 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of 
Payments databases, World Bank, Global Development Finance, and World Bank and OECD 
GDP estimates, own calculation by authors. 
 
(19) Labour Force [lab] 
Total labor force comprises people who meet the International Labour Organization definition 
of the economically active population: all people who supply labor for the production of 
goods and services during a specified period. It includes both the employed and the 
unemployed. 
Source: International Labour Organization, using World Bank population estimates. 
 
(20) Annual Labour Force Growth Rate [labgrowth] 
Out of this Labour Force values for the observed 109 countries over the years 1990 to 2000 
the explanatory variable Annual Labour Force Growth Rate has been calculated using the 
formula 
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Source: International Labour Organization, using World Bank population estimates, own 
calculation by authors. 
 
7.2.3  Regression Outputs in more Detail 
In this section of the Appendix the regression outputs are presented in a more detailed way, 
where several results such a t- or z-statistics, F-tests, R-Squared within, between and overall 
can be found. Additionally the regression results for Cluster-Regressions are listed in detail. 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    50 
As already mentioned above all regressions are estimated with ‘Intercooled Stata 8.0’ using 
panel regression commands. For general information and econometric details concerning 
panel regressions see Long (1996), Greene (1997) or Wooldridge (2000). 
 
Panel Regression Total 1990 – 2000 using the Fixed-Effect Approach [fe] 
Total Fixed Effects [fe] 
Fixed-effects (within) regression            Number of obs      =       193 
Group variable (i): id                       Number of groups   =       104 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3400                      Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0375                                     avg =       1.9 
       overall = 0.0291                                     max =         2 
 
                                             F(9,80)            =      4.58 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9616                     Prob > F           =    0.0001 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    growgdpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.   t    P>|t|     [90% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
     shadind |   .2317538   .3515235     0.66   0.512   -.3532252  .8167327 
     shaddev |  -.3288186   .1867277    -1.76   0.082   -.6395566 -.0180805 
        open |   .0343245   .0332882     1.03   0.306   -.0210711  .0897202 
    inflrest |  -.0064754   .0310026    -0.21   0.835   -.0580676  .0451167 
    infltran |  -.0313483   .0092144    -3.40   0.001   -.0466822 -.0160143 
         gov |   .1020515   .1876892     0.54   0.588   -.2102867  .4143897 
  lastgrowth |   .0442639   .0795051     0.56   0.579   -.0880426  .1765703 
         pop |  -.0004899   .0004327    -1.13   0.261     -.00121  .0002301 
        caac |   .0192958   .0137675     1.40   0.165    -.003615  .0422066 
       _cons |   .0810733    .061764     1.31   0.193   -.0217096  .1838563 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .12701133 
     sigma_e |  .03371631 
         rho |  .93417041   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(103, 80) =     1.14          Prob > F = 0.2703 
Regression Output Detail 1 - Source: Own calculation by authors 
 
It shows that the Dummy [ind] and the Dummy [tran] are dropped from the regression with 
the Fixed-Effect Approach since there is no variation in these variables over time. The next 
step is to estimate the same equation once more with the Random-Effects Approach and 
afterwards test with a Hausman-McFadden-Specification Test which of the two model 
specifications has to be preferred
47. 
 
H0 states that the Random-Effects model has to be preferred. H1 then suggests the Fixed-
Effects Model to be the right specification. Therefore if H0 cannot be rejected at a 
conventional confidence level, the Random-Effects Model is the correct specification. 
 
                                                           
47 For more details concerning ‘panel regressions’ and ‘specification tests’ see Wooldridge (2000) and Long 
(1996). 07.06.04, C:\Schneider\ShadEconomyWorld5.doc    51 
Panel Regression Total 1990 – 2000 using the Random-Effect Approach [re] 
Total Random Effects [re] 
Random-effects GLS regression                Number of obs      =       193 
Group variable (i): id                       Number of groups   =       104 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2662                      Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.4174                                     avg =       1.9 
       overall = 0.3436                                     max =         2 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                Wald chi2(9)       =     94.63 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)             Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    growgdpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.   z    P>|z|     [90% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
     shadind |   .0769996   .0292499     2.63   0.008    .0288878  .1251115 
     shaddev |  -.0516262    .021763    -2.37   0.018   -.0874231 -.0158293 
        open |   .0123984   .0058027     2.14   0.033    .0028538   .021943 
    inflrest |   .0230645   .0174138     1.32   0.185   -.0055786  .0517076 
    infltran |  -.0210372   .0051337    -4.10   0.000   -.0294814  -.012593 
         gov |  -.1806035    .055867    -3.23   0.001   -.2724966 -.0887104 
  lastgrowth |    .153827   .0502364     3.06   0.002    .0711955  .2364584 
         pop |    .000036   .0000174     2.07   0.039    7.39e-06  .0000647 
        caac |   .0185635   .0098691     1.88   0.060    .0023303  .0347967 
       _cons |   .0618808   .0149818     4.13   0.000    .0372379  .0865237 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   .0087508 
     sigma_e |  .03371631 
         rho |  .06311078   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
Regression Output Detail 2 - Source: Own calculation by authors 
 
The now following Hausman Test shows that H0 cannot be rejected at a conventional level 
and thus we have to give the Random-Effects model preference over the Fixed-Effects model. 
 
 
Hausman–McFadden-Specification Test 
                ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      Fixed       Random 
    growgdpc |    Effects      Effects       Difference 
-------------+----------------------------------------- 
     shadind |   .2317538     .0769996         .1547542 
     shaddev |  -.3288186    -.0516262        -.2771924 
        open |   .0343245     .0123984         .0219262 
    inflrest |  -.0064754     .0230645        -.0295399 
    infltran |  -.0313483    -.0210372        -.0103111 
         gov |   .1020515    -.1806035          .282655 
  lastgrowth |   .0442639      .153827        -.1095631 
         pop |  -.0004899      .000036         -.000526 
        caac |   .0192958     .0185635         .0007323 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
              chi2(  9) = (b-B)'[S^(-1)](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re) 
                        =    10.89 
              Prob>chi2 =     0.2834 
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Panel Regression for OECD Countries 1990 – 2000 [oecd==1 and re] 
OECD Random Effects [re] 
Random-effects GLS regression                Number of obs      =        94 
Group variable (i): id                       Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2128                      Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.7168                                     avg =       4.5 
       overall = 0.3700                                     max =         5 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                Wald chi2(6)       =     51.10 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)             Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    growgdpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.   z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
        year |  -.0031079   .0009262    -3.36   0.001   -.0049231 -.0012926 
        shad |   .0782766   .0380983     2.05   0.040    .0036054  .1529478 
        open |   .0155147   .0062813     2.47   0.014    .0032036  .0278258 
        caac |   .1267053   .0365311     3.47   0.001    .0551056   .198305 
   fdigrowth |   .0042132   .0016938     2.49   0.013    .0008935  .0075329 
   labgrowth |   .9505111   .3891057     2.44   0.015    .1878778  1.713144 
       _cons |   6.205567   1.847538     3.36   0.001    2.584459  9.826674 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .01887023 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Regression Output Detail 6 - Source: Own calculation by authors 
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